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Kolmogorov’s first axiom of probability is probability takes values between 0 and 1; however,
in Cox’s derivation of probability having a maximum value of unity is arbitrary since he derives
probability as a tool to rank degrees of plausibility. Probability can then be used to make inferences
in instances of incomplete information, which is the foundation of Baysian probability theory. This
article formulates a rule, which if obeyed, allows probability to take complex values and still be
consistent with the interpretation of probability theory as being a tool to rank plausibility. It
is then shown that Kirkwood distributions and the conditional complex probability distributions
proposed by Hofmann do not obey this rule and therefore cannot rank plausibility. Not only do
these quasiprobability distributions relax Kolmogorov’s first axiom of probability, they also are void
of the defining property of a probability distribution from a Coxian and Baysian perspective - they
lack the ability to rank plausibility.
I. INTRODUCTION
Probability theory as derived by Cox (and later Jaynes
and Caticha) is a tool an observer can use to rank degrees
of plausibility in instances of incomplete information [1–
3]. Accordingly, scientists can use probability to make
useful inferences quantified by changes in a probability
distribution when new information is attained. Probabil-
ity functions have a few mathematical properties: they
are normalized, 0 ≤ p(a) ≤ 1, obey a sum and prod-
uct rule, and marginalize; but arguably the most useful
statement in probability theory is Bayes’ Rule because it
forms the basis of inference in probability theory. Bayes’
Rule is represented by,
p(a)→ p′(a) ≡ p(a|b) = p(a)p(b|a)
p(b)
, (1)
which quantifies a new probability distribution for “a”
once “b” is learned to be true causing the distribution
for “a” to change by factors |p′(a) − p(a)| ≥ 0. a gen-
eral probability function p(a|b) is a unique function that
accomplishes all of the goals above up to arbitrary re-
graduation (or rescaling) p(a|b) ≡ ξ([a|b]), which forces
0 ≤ p(a|b) ≤ 1 rather than taking arbitrary values
0 = vF ≤ [a|b] ≤ vT on the real axis. Probability takes
real values so one can rank degrees of plausibility from
not plausible, vF , to absolute certainty, vT , which in-
evitably allows probability to be used as a tool for rea-
soning, inference, and measurement [1–3].
The renewed interest in Weak Values Aw =
〈b|Aˆ|a〉
〈b|a〉 [4–
6] has revitalized discussion of Kirkwood distributions
pK(a, b) = 〈b|a〉〈a|ρˆ|b〉 [7, 8] and given rise to notions of a
complex conditional probability pK(m|a, b) = 〈b|m〉〈m|a〉〈b|a〉
(a conditional Kirkwood distribution) [9–12] by Hof-
mann. Because Weak Values are in principle complex
numbers, the measurement (or perhaps more appropri-
ately the inference) of them through post selection 〈b|
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of a prepared state |a〉 has lead to a surplus of obscure
and seemingly paradoxical results [6, 13, 14]. In the
literature, Kirkwood distributions are often likened to
probability distributions because they marginalize cor-
rectly p(a) =
∑
b pK(a, b) =
∑
b〈b|a〉〈a|ρˆ|b〉 = Tr(ρˆ|a〉〈a|)
and p(b) =
∑
a pK(a, b) =
∑
a〈b|a〉〈a|ρˆ|b〉 = Tr(ρˆ|b〉〈b|)
with the disclaimer that in-fact they are quasiproba-
bility distributions because they take complex values
thereby relaxing Kolmogorov’s first axiom of probability,
0 ≤ p(a|b) ≤ 1.
Because Cox and Kolmogorov derive probability the-
ory independently of one another, we can evaluate how
Kirkwood distributions and probability distributions dif-
fer from a Coxian perspective and obtain additional in-
sight. The extent that Coxian probability theory is com-
patible with probability functions/theories taking com-
plex values will be shown in the next section. This is then
used to show that Kirkwood distributions and complex
conditional probability distributions in the sense of Hof-
mann are unlike and incompatible with standard proba-
bility distributions because transitivity is not preserved
and therefore Kirkwood distributions cannot rank plau-
sibility.
II. THE EXTENT THAT PROBABILITY CAN
BE COMPLEX AND CONSISTENT
In Coxian derivations of probability theory [1–3] one
requires the transitive property to rank degrees of plau-
sibility: if a is more plausible than b and b is more plau-
sible then c then a must be more plausible than c. If
we let [a|b] be the plausibility function of a given b (will
eventually be p(a|b) in standard notion) then the transi-
tive property of the plausibility function can be satisfied
if [a|b] maps the space of propositions a ∈ A to the real
number line r ∈ R. To be consistent, the plausibility
function has the two extremal values imposed by transi-
tivity: the plausibility of a given a is [a|a] = vT is true
and not-a given a, [a˜|a] = vF , is completely implausible
and vT > vF . Because vT ≡ [a∨ a˜|a] = vT + vF , where ∨
2is the “or” logic proposition, we have in general vF = 0
giving in principle a lower bound.
To explore in what sense a probability distribution can
be complex and still agree with standard probability the-
ory, let the plausibility function map a ∈ A to a point
z′ = [a|b] in the complex plane C. Because in general the
inequality z1 ≤ z2 between any two arbitrary complex
numbers z1, z2 ∈ C is poorly defined there is no notion
(known to the author) of monotonicity in the complex
plane. We therefore define a “monotonic curve” c′ to
be an arbitrary curve in the complex plane (piece-wise
or otherwise) which can be ordered by applying an order
preserving transformationsO which maps c′ onto the real
axis. The trivial examples are if c′ lies along the real axis
in C such that O = 1 or if c′ is constrained to the imagi-
nary axis between 0 and i then 0 ≤ [a|b] ≤ i and therefore
O = e−ipi/2 = −i. In the second case our probability dis-
tribution would have the feature that
∑
a[a|b] ≡ i = vT
but this is by no means physical - it is simply a repa-
rameterization of what number represents certainty or
quantifies a fraction of certainty. To be consistent with
probability theory, any “monotonic curve” c′ must be
mapped to R by O where inferences can be made (prob-
ability updated, added, or multiplied) and then it may be
mapped back to c′ by O−1 to give a complex representa-
tion of the plausibility/probability of a proposition. The
set of monotonic curves c′ ∈ C′ which can be mapped
to R turns out to be any curve c′ in the complex plane
which is non-self intersecting (e.g. a spiral with the label
vF and vT at the endpoints), because any non-self inter-
secting curve can be ‘unwound” by O to unique positions
on R ≥ 0. If there exists a point of intersection z′0 on
c′ then one would have to map it to two points along
R consequently not preserve transitivity and the proba-
bility function would lose the interpretation of “ranking
plausibility”. Finding the specific operator O which ac-
complishes this is for any c′ is not the focus of this paper
and will not be discussed further. It is also required that
vT 6= vF for the function [a|b] such that the plausibility
has a nonzero measure. If pK(a, b) and pK(m|a, b) are
consistent with probability theory then must take values
along a non self intersecting curve c′ ∈ C′ for arbitrary
a, b,m, and vT , vF must be defined.
III. NON-COMPATIBILITY OF KIRKWOOD
DISTRIBUTIONS WITH COXIAN
PROBABILITY
Consider the Weak Value of |ϕ〉〈ϕ| preselected in the
|a〉 = |ψm〉 = (2pi)−1/2
∫
dϕ eimϕ|ϕ〉 where m is the mag-
netic/angular momentum quantum number, and post se-
lected in the state |b〉 = √1− δ2|ψn〉 + δ|ψm〉 (and let δ
be real for simplicity). This Weak Value has the form
of a complex (or weak) conditional probability density
[9–12], and one finds that
pK(ϕ|a, b) = 〈b|ϕ〉〈ϕ|a〉〈b|a〉 =
1
2pi
+
√
1− δ2
2piδ
eiϕ(m−n) (2)
takes values spanning a circle in the complex plane cen-
tered at 12pi with a radius
√
1−δ2
2piδ which may grow ar-
bitrary large for arbitrarily small δ. Each value of
pK(ϕ|a, b) lies somewhere on a curve c′1 (in principle a
segment of c′) and should indicate a different degree of
plausibility for each unique value of z′(ϕ) = pK(ϕ|a, b),
but because no value of vF or vT is given for pK , it is
impossible in this single case to determine the opera-
tion O which could be used to map c′ to R (we don’t
know where to cut the circle). Because any value of
pK(m|a, b) must be on the curve c′ for the framework
to be consistent and because the wavefunction is a Weak
Value pK(x|p,Ψ) = kΨ(x) [13], which in principle has
values spanning another curve c′2 which intersects c
′
1,
it therefore follows that pK(m|a, b) does not preserve
transitivity because c′ is a self intersecting curve. The
Kirkwood distribution pK(a, b) and its complex conju-
gate pK(b, a) = p
∗
K(a, b) are separate distributions, but in
principle can output real values z0 in the complex plane,
which means the two distributions exist on a self inter-
secting curve (at the real value). Therefore we arrive
at the main result - Kirkwood distributions pK(a, b) and
complex conditional probability distributions pK(m|a, b)
are not consistent with Coxian probability theory be-
cause they fail to identify and differentiate degrees of
plausibility and cannot be used for inference. It follows
that a Bayes rule for complex conditional probability
p(m) → p′(m) ≡ p(m|a, b) nolonger quantifies a change
in the probability distribution (or state of knowledge)
of a system when new information about the system is
learned.
One potential objection is that perhaps each pK(a, b)
takes values on its own curve c′ρ, but if that were the case
then no two distributions pK(a, b) and pK(a, b)
′ could be
compared and the function pK(a, b) loses its universality
which is another component of Coxian probability the-
ory [1–3]. It has has been shown [8] that the elements of
a density matrix ρˆ =
∑
a,b ρab|a〉〈b| where ρab = pK(a,b)〈a|b〉
can be known if one measures pK(a, b), but it is, in-fact,
standard probability theory (in Quantum Mechanics us-
ing weak measurements and Weak Values) which allows
one to make inferences about the most probable values of
pK(a, b) and thereby infer ρab - their values are inferred
through measurement of spacial and angular (probabil-
ity) distributions of coherent light [15].
IV. CONCLUSION
It has been shown that probability distributions which
take complex values are only consistent with probability
theory if the distribution takes values on a nonintersect-
ing curve c′ in the complex plane which can be mapped
to the real number line by an order preserving operation
O to preserve transitivity such that probability function-
ally ranks degrees plausibility. Because Kirkwood distri-
butions are not consistent with Coxian probability the-
3ory, we offer the notation for the aforementioned condi-
tional complex probability pK(m|a, b)→ K(m|a, b) (pos-
sibly better named a conditioned Kirkwood distribution
or simply the Weak Value of m) and pK(a, b)→ K(a, b)
such that they are not misinterpreted and utilized as
probability distributions which rank degrees of plausi-
bility. This development extends the extent which Kirk-
wood distributions differ from probability distributions;
not only do Kirkwood distributions relax the first Kol-
mogorov axiom of probability they also are not able to
rank plausibility.
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